INTRODUCTION T
here is little doubt that multinational companies (MNCs) are important drivers of globalisation (International Labor Organization, 2012) . Within this context, there is a significant debate in the international business literature on the extent to which MNCs transfer their HR policies and practices. While we find evidence that MNCs attempt to transfer managerial policies from the home to host countries (Guillen, 2001; Pudelko and Harzing, 2007) , the extent to which the same HR policies work equally effectively in diverse contexts, and the likelihood of their gaining legitimacy therein, is open to question . Indeed, it is precisely this conundrum that has encouraged MNCs to adapt managerial policies to the local context, and thereby attempt to accommodate different national idiosyncrasies and distinctive organisational forms commonplace in the host locations in which they operate (Guillen, 2001; Djelic and Quack, 2003) .
Studies examining the nature and extent to which HR policies and practices are transferred by MNCs have increased considerably in the last decade (Pudelko and Harzing, 2007; Fenton-O'Creevy, 2008; Lavelle et al., 2009; Ferner et al., 2011) . However, with a few exceptions, there remains a distinct lack of quantitative empirical research in this field due to the challenge of gathering such data directly from the specialist HR function among representative samples of MNCs . In taking up this challenge, our study is characterised by three distinguishing features.
First, the manner in which home and host country differences are dimensionalised is an important feature of our research effort. We use the theoretical lens of varieties of capitalisms (VoC) as explicated in detail by Amable (2003) in order to provide what can be considered a JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 2 SESS: 27 OUTPUT: Fri Aug 3 17:49:14 2012 SUM: 6932F60C /v2451/blackwell/journals/hrmj_2009_new_design/hrmj_204 more nuanced perspective in observing and explaining the extent to which different labour market rigidities impact HRM subsidiary autonomy.
Second, there is dearth of research on the relationship between subsidiary autonomy over HRM and international HR structures (Ferner et al., 2011) . Where the impact of international HRM structures have been analysed, this has often involved combinations or groups of structures rather than unearthing the potentially differential impact of individual international HR structures (Ferner et al., 2011) . The present research addresses this weakness through examining individual international HR structures separately, and dissecting possible differences they might have on HRM subsidiary autonomy.
Third, the analysis of HR practices in foreign-owned MNCs in Spain has been the object of few quantitative-based studies. While recent works present some insights on HRM in Spain (Ferner et al., 2001; Cabrera and Carretero, 2005; Quintanilla et al., 2008 Quintanilla et al., , 2010 , we know little of the factors impacting on the extent of subsidiary autonomy over HR issues in MNC subsidiaries. This article provides a rigorous analysis using data on HR practices collected from foreign MNCs subsidiaries located in Spain.
Against this backdrop, the precise research gap which we address is the identification of those factors influencing the extent of local autonomy over HR practices in foreign-owned MNCs in Spain.
CENTRAL CONTROL AND SUBSIDIARY AUTONOMY IN MNCS
The question of HR policies pursued by MNCs in their globally dispersed subsidiaries has been extensively studied over recent years (Pudelko and Harzing, 2007; Brewster et al., 2008; Fenton-O'Creevy et al., 2008) . Authors from the institutional strand of the literature have pointed to the 'global-local' tension, namely the countervailing pressures for standard, centrally developed and managed policies versus the need to ensure HR policy and practice is sensitive to and reflective of the norms and traditions of the host context (Brewster et al., 2008; Fenton-O'Creevy et al., 2008) . In other words, there is potential for conflict between a desire to maintain central control on the part of MNC headquarter (HQ) and the countervailing demand for autonomy on the part of the subsidiary in certain domains of HRM policy and practice. In this article, autonomy can be viewed as the extent to which the subsidiary acts as a policy-making 'authority' (Fenton-O'Creevy et al., 2008; Ferner et al., 2011) . The extant literature identifies a number of possible approaches. Some HQs do not accord subsidiaries any effective level of local autonomy, and these are therefore expected to implement policies set by HQ. At the other extreme, some HQs allow subsidiaries full autonomy in setting HRM policy (Ferner et al., 2011) . There clearly is room also for intermediary approaches whereby subsidiaries are afforded some local autonomy to develop HR policies within certain guidelines or frameworks set by the HQ or in certain domain HR areas approved by HQ (Harzing, 1999; Ferner et al., 2007; 2011) .
HOME AND HOST COUNTRY EFFECTS ON HRM CONTROL

A 'VoC' approach
In an attempt to discern the impact of different home and host environments on management practice, some scholars have employed the lens of 'VoC' as articulated by Hall and Soskice (2001) . This focuses especially on the role of markets, firms, state ownership and regulation. Although the dichotomous differentiation between coordinated market economies (CMES) and liberal market economies (LMEs) simplifies analysis and the application of the VoC to different areas, such as HRM, it is only based on one dimension, namely market coordination; this theoretical approach has one important limitation, however. Amable (2003) addresses this deficiency through including additional dimensions, namely product market competition, labour market characteristics, the financial sector and corporate governance, social protection, and the education system, all of which in combination are viewed as holding explanatory power. From our perspective, the particular advantage of Amable's classification is that it is more nuanced, differentiating between five types of capitalism: market-based capitalism (US, UK, Canada and Australia), Continental European capitalism (Germany, France, Belgium and Austria), social democratic capitalism (Denmark, Sweden and Finland), Asian capitalism (Japan and Korea) and Mediterranean capitalism (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece). Of the five dimensions advanced by Amable (2003) , labour market characteristics are arguably the most influential aspect in terms of HRM configuration and international integration. Table 1 shows the main differences among the five distinctive capitalisms based on the labour market features.
As Whitley (1999 Whitley ( , 2003 noted, labour markets are 'often governed' by employment regulations, organisation of employment representation as well as the 'system of wage bargaining and employer-employee relations'. Therefore, labour market's features can act as a driver or obstacle to attempts to transfer policies from the HQ to subsidiaries (Muller-Camen et al., 2001) . Researchers examining HRM in MNCs suggest that MNCs that emanate from LMEs are predisposed to the centralisation of HR policies and practices across borders, while MNCs coming from CMEs are more likely to use a more decentralised approach to HRM because of (Fenton-O'Creevy et al., 2008; Ferner et al., 2011) . This leads Ferner et al. (2011) to suggest that foreign subsidiaries of MNCs originating in CMEs enjoy higher levels of subsidiary autonomy than those coming from LMEs. This seems to particularly characterise US MNCs, where we find a large body of research pointing towards the centralisation of HR practices Ferner et al., 2011) . Flexible labour market features offer a scenario where indigenous MNCs easily might get used to 'strategic freedom', and therefore follow the same pattern wherever they operate. However, are US MNCs the only case where this 'strategic freedom' is translated into centralisation, or on the contrary, would it be also the case of MNCs originated in other liberal markets economies? On the other hand, rigid labour market features provide a constraining scenario where indigenous MNCs arguably become accustomed to limitations on their behaviour/practice, and thus they will follow this tendency towards local adaptation wherever they are (Ferner et al., 2011) . In the light of these contributions, our first hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: MNCs originating in flexible labour market regimes will accord lower levels of HR autonomy to their subsidiaries than those MNCs originating in rigid labour markets.
Global mandates and the subsidiary responsibility
Scholars have emphasised the relevance of subsidiaries' mandate as a determining factor of the level of central control (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Martínez and Jarillo, 1989) , although there is no consensus on its impact. Ambos and Schlegelmilch (2007) suggest that subsidiaries with international responsibility accorded by global mandates from HQ are more likely to experience lower levels of autonomy. This means that the higher the level of subsidiary responsibility internationally, the higher the level of central control (Ambos and Schlegelmilch, 200l) , particularly subsidiary mandates regarding research and development (R&D). Although the creation of new knowledge requires freedom at an operational level, the transfer of this knowledge throughout the MNC demands well-established control mechanisms. On the other hand, the literature on organisational power suggests something different. This posits that high levels of international responsibilities confer a high level of structural power on the subsidiary. We also find literature that relates subsidiary power in negotiations with HQ to the size of subsidiary (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Holm and Pedersen, 2000) , whereby the larger the subsidiary, the greater its power level. In terms of decreasing HQ control, having a substantial R&D mandate places the subsidiary in a stronger power position vis-à-vis HQ in setting HRM policies (Edwards et al., 2002) . In addition to the importance of the scope of the R&D mandate, power may also be stronger in situations where the subsidiary mandate includes the development of international products, or where international exports are a significant portion of overall subsidiary sales (Edwards et al., 2002) . Based on this premise, several authors argue that the existence of critical resources located in the subsidiary is also a key factor impacting on the transfer of HR policies (Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 1998; Edwards et al., 1999; Ferner et al., 2005) . Therefore, having critical resources within the MNC can be an explanatory reason for the level of HR subsidiary autonomy. Overall therefore, it is plausible to suggest that responsibility for global mandates plays an important role in determining HR subsidiary autonomy, and the higher the level of international responsibility in terms of global mandates of the MNC subsidiary, the higher the level of local autonomy enjoyed by the subsidiary. This interpretation is supported by Edwards et al. (2002: 185) , who state that, 'as a result of possessing such a mandate, the subsidiary gains access to parent expertise but retains a degree of managerial 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46 autonomy. This arrangement has the subsidiary playing a role much more like an equal partner of the MNC than a subordinate entity'. In order to further explicate and test this issue, we offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The higher the level of the subsidiary's mandate on international R&D, international products and exports, the higher the level of subsidiary autonomy over HR practices.
International HR structures
As noted above, we find very little research on the relationship between central control over HR practices and global HR structures. Harzing (1999) noted that HR practices, being a strategic issue, are often subjected to central control. Moreover, central control has been related to the existence of governance structures, and also coordination and control mechanisms (Harzing, 1999; Ferner et al., 2011) . Some evidence suggests that the use of international HR structures might be, therefore, a sign of greater monitoring and coordination of HR practices across borders (Harzing, 1999; Ferner et al., 2011) .
To an extent, the way MNCs coordinate and control their subsidiaries reflects the extent of standardisation and formalisation of these HRM systems and procedures (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Martínez and Jarillo, 1989; Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994; Harzing, 1999; Ferner et al., 2011) . Building on Ferner et al. (2011) , we therefore identify a number of international HR structures related to HR subsidiary autonomy as follows: the presence of the international HR policy-making body, HR data reporting, international HR information systems and an international HR shared services facility. While previous studies in this area have examined the impact of combinations of these international HR structures (Ferner et al., 2011) , we decided to investigate each structure individually. First, the existence of an international HR body that determines, formulates and implements new global policies represents a potentially crucial factor impacting on the extent of central control over HRM issues. It would seem that where the HR policy-making body is present, we might expect that HR subsidiary autonomy tends to be lower than otherwise. Second, Ferner et al. (2011) argue that formal direct data reporting on HR issues from subsidiaries to HQ also helps explain variation in HR subsidiary autonomy, with low levels of subsidiary autonomy related to high levels of HR reporting to HQ. Third, the use of international HR information systems, such as SAP or PeopleSoft, might also be expected to impact on subsidiary autonomy. For example, Stiles et al. (2006) found that several companies, such as Oracle, Siemens, Samsung and Shell, utilise a complete online database with specific systems for performance appraisal, 'high potential' pools and internal vacancies. This relationship argues that HR subsidiary is likely to be low in subsidiaries using an international HR information system. Finally, regarding international HR shared services, Farndale and Paauwe (2005) identify how MNCs, such as IKEA, provide global HR services for HR through such centres in order to enhance the control and coordination of global HRM. More recently, Ferner et al. (2011) suggested that the use of these centres is related to lower levels of HR subsidiary autonomy. However, Ferner et al. (2011) only supported that the direct reporting of HR issues is related to subsidiary autonomy. We posit that all of them are related to HR subsidiary autonomy. Based on these contributions, we suggest the following hypotheses: 
METHOD
This study draws on data from a large-scale survey on HR policies and practices in foreign multinationals operating in Spain (see Quintanilla et al., 2010) . The survey data are the result of a multistage project which commenced with the establishment of a detailed database of the population of foreign-owned MNCs in Spain. The identification of the population was no easy task. The lack of representativeness within MNCs studies has been remarked over many years, with critics identifying a sample bias towards large companies, US-owned, manufacturing, well-known companies (Collings and Rugman, 2010) . Based on other studies, such as Edwards et al. (2008) and McDonnell et al. (2007) , the definition of foreign MNC used in this research was the following: foreign firms that employed at least 500 employees worldwide and at least 100 in Spain. The listing of the populations was drawn on SABI, AMADEUS, ORBIS and HOOVER. As occurred among parallel studies (McDonnell et al., 2007; Edwards et al. 2008) , this task identified a number of difficulties, particularly the duplication of companies or the lack of reliable information on certain company details (e.g. employment numbers). Companies that had missing or inaccurate data within these databases were cross-checked via other sources (Williams, 1997) , such as the Chambers of Commerce, Madrid stock market, websites or specialised business magazines. The database resulting from this exercise was comprised of 894 foreign MNCs operating in Spain. The third step was the administration of the questionnaire. The population was contacted by post (100 per cent of the population) and by email, and also by phone in a small number of cases (Quintanilla et al., 2010) . The response rate was 27.1 per cent. A total of 242 foreign companies participated in the study. The survey was administered by the members of the research team between 2007 and 2009 (pilot stage inclusive). The duration of the interviews was from 1 hour to an hour and a half using a face-to-face administered questionnaire. The survey examined HR practice related to three mutually exclusive groups of employees, namely the 'largest occupational group' (LOG), 'managers' and the 'key group'. The LOG was defined as 'the largest non-managerial occupational group among the workforce in the Spanish subsidiary'. Managers were classified as 'employees who primarily manage the organisation, or a department, subdivision, function or component of the organisation, and whose main tasks consist of the direction and coordination of the organisation. It does not include those who simply oversee others, such as supervisors, even if their job title includes the word "manager", such as office manager'. The key group was classified as 'those employees who can be identified as critical to the company's core competence, such as research staff, product designers, major account handlers, developers of new markets, etc. It did not necessarily have to be a sub group of management'.
MEASURES
Dependent variables
Global subsidiary autonomy over HR policies As noted earlier, the degree of autonomy afforded to MNC subsidiaries in HR policy making and implementation has been the focus of previous research. Certain authors have examined subsidiary autonomy as a binary issue JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 7 SESS: 27 OUTPUT: Fri Aug 3 17:49:14 2012 SUM: 5AFD66D0 /v2451/blackwell/journals/hrmj_2009_new_design/hrmj_204 (Fenton-O'Creevy et al., 2008) , while others have considered it as a gradual scale in their attempt to deepen our understanding of the concept (Ferner et al., 2011) . Our approach was to employ a standard Likert scale (1-5), with three main anchor points as follows: 1 = The Spanish operations have no autonomy (must implement policy set by a higher level such as corporate or regional HQ) 3 = The Spanish operations have some autonomy (can develop policy within the guidelines/ framework set by a higher organisational level) 5 = The Spanish operations have full autonomy (can set own policy)
The construction of the dependent variable was undertaken through a first-and secondorder factor analysis as set out below, resulting in a single construct, that is global subsidiary autonomy over HR policies.
1 Subsidiary autonomy over pay and rewards Our measure consisted of four items, namely the degree of subsidiary autonomy over relating its pay levels to market comparators, over variable payments schemes for managers, the LOG and the key group. Reliability as measured by Cronbach's alpha was 0.88.
Subsidiary autonomy over performance appraisal systems This measure comprised three items, namely the degree of subsidiary autonomy over performance appraisals for the managers, for the key group and for the LOG. The Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient was 0.98.
Subsidiary autonomy over training and development
This is a composite construct formed by three different items: the degree of subsidiary autonomy over training and development policies, over succession planning policies, and over the organisational learning policy. The Cronbach's alpha coefficient was 0.75.
Subsidiary autonomy over employee involvement
This construct was measured by three items, namely the degree of subsidiary autonomy over attitude surveys and suggestion schemes, over provision of information to employees, and employee involvement in the workplace in terms of teamwork and other forms of organisations. This measure yielded a Cronbach's alpha of 0.59.
Independent variables
The diversity of capitalisms variable reflects the typology of capitalism of the home country following the five clusters described by Amable (2003) : (a) market-based capitalism, (b) social democratic capitalism, (c) Asian capitalism, (d) Continental European capitalism and (e) Mediterranean capitalism. This variable is based on Amable's order of classification in terms of the underlying rigidity of the labour market. Thus, the variable measures from the most flexible labour market to the most rigid labour market. Our main reason for following this specific order is the fact that Spain belongs to the Mediterranean capitalism, which is the most rigid labour market system. As previously said, labour market regulations are probably the most relevant aspect in terms of HRM configuration and international integration.
The responsibility facing global mandates is a construct consisting of three items that strive to assess the degree of international responsibility of the subsidiary regarding three relevant issues. The first item refers to the international subsidiary responsibility for one or more products or services on behalf of the worldwide company. The second item refers to the significant expertise in R&D within the worldwide company that is generated in the subsidiary. The third item refers to the percentage of revenues from sales abroad. The first two items follow a 1-5 Likert scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). The third item follows a scale of 1-5 (1 = 0-20 per cent; 2 = 21-40 per cent; 3 = 41-60 per cent; 4 = 61-80 per cent; and 5 = 81-100 per cent). The Cronbach's alpha was 0.98. Direct reporting on HR issues includes nine items that were all measured through binary questions (1 = yes, 0 = no). The HR issues considered were the following: (a) managerial pay packages, (b) management career progression, (c) overall labour costs, (d) numbers employed (headcount), (e) staff turnover, (f) absenteeism, (g) productivity, (h) workforce composition by diversity (e.g. gender, ethnicity, disability, etc.), and (i) employee attitude and satisfaction.
The use of an international IT system for HR issues, such us PeopleSoft or SAP HR, was collected as a binary variable (1 = yes, 0 = no).
This was also the case of the existence of specific global shared services for HR issues, and the existence of the HR policy-making body within the worldwide company, such as a committee of senior managers that develops HR policies that apply across countries. An only index has been created as a result of the sum of the two of them (from 0 to 2).
Moderator variables
A number of moderator variables were included based on the literature. The sector of operations (Katz and Darbishire, 2000; Fenton-O'Creevy et al., 2008) was asked as a simple dichotomous question (1 = manufacturing sector, 2 = services sector). The size of the subsidiary (Fenton O'Creevy, 2008; Ferner et al., 2011) was measured as the number of employees (1 = 100-499; 2 = 500-4,999; 3 = more than 5,000). The age of the subsidiary (Fenton O'Creevy, 2008) was taken as a numeric variable comprising the exact number of years the subsidiary has operations within the host country.
RESULTS
Before the analysis, we detail the main features of the sample. As previously stated, the sample comprised 242 foreign MNCs operating in Spain. Of these, 56.6 per cent were in the services sector, with 43.4 per cent being engaged in manufacturing. Regarding the size of the MNCs measured by number of employees worldwide, roughly 200 companies (accounting for 83.9 per cent) are large MNCs employing more than 5,000 employees globally. The medium size firms (from 1,000 to 4,999 worldwide employees) represent 12.4 per cent of our sample. The remaining percentage, 3.7 per cent, can be considered small MNCs (from 500 to 999 employees globally). Information on the countries of origin of the subsidiaries is presented in Table 2 . In terms of accounting for foreign direct investment inflows into Spain, MNCs coming from Europe (56.9 per cent) and the US (37.6 per cent) are the biggest players, with Japan accounting for another 4 per cent approximately. European MNCs (non-Spanish) that operate in Spain are mainly from France (16.1 per cent), Germany (13.2 per cent) and the UK (10.2 per cent).
Almost half of MNC subsidiaries in our sample originate from countries characterised as being market-based capitalist economies (see Table 3 
Degree of subsidiary autonomy over the HR policies
The arithmetic average for the degree of subsidiary autonomy was calculated for all the HR policies in order to explore the degree of centralisation. Based on our findings, levels of HR subsidiary autonomy in Spain are generally from medium levels to higher levels (from 3 to 5 within the five-point Likert scale considered). The highest levels of subsidiary autonomy exist in the policy areas dealing with employee involvement (4.55), the provision of information to employees (4.44), training and development (4.17), and organisational learning (4.00). However, the level of subsidiary autonomy seems to be slightly more limited in policy domains relating pay levels to market comparators (3.87), attitude surveys and suggestion schemes (3.77), and succession planning for senior managers (3.45).
The remainder of the HR areas examined in this research project are more centralised at the HQ level. Thus, the policy areas that the MNC subsidiaries in Spain are least likely to have responsibility for are performance appraisals for the key group (3.21), for the LOG (3.07) and managers (3.04); and on variable payments schemes for the key group (3.32), the LOG (3.08) and managers (3.09). As referred to earlier, the literature describes how some companies tend to centralise more than others. Generally speaking, we see substantial differences between companies coming from one context or another. Table 4 shows the arithmetic averages with regard to the typology of capitalism from where the firms originate.
Determinants of subsidiary autonomy in HR: a structural equation model (SEM)
In order to establish the determinants of subsidiary autonomy over HR issues, a general SEM (Hair et al., 1999) following the two-step approach of Anderson and Gerbing (1988) was performed. This approach first estimates the measurement model through a confirmatory factor analysis, and second validates the causal relations between variables within the structural model. SEM is the most appropriate and robust method in this case in order to contrast the factors that determine the subsidiary autonomy in HR issues, due to the type of questions that the survey contains: that is, mostly Likert scale-based items. This allows us to develop several constructs regarding the dependent variable and the independent variables, and to test the hypotheses outlined earlier. JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 11 SESS: 27 OUTPUT: Fri Aug 3 17:49:14 2012 SUM: 713072F1 /v2451/blackwell/journals/hrmj_2009_new_design/hrmj_204
First, we created a construct for the dependent variable within the measurement model. We assessed item and scale reliability by examining the loadings of observable items on the corresponding underlying first-order factors. The standardised factor loadings were all over 0.5, which is within the recommended limits with regard to social science analysis (Hair et al., 1999) . The significance of the factor analysis provides support for the convergent validity of the constructs, together with the composite reliability measured by Cronbach's alpha previously. Furthermore, all the average variances extracted are over 50 per cent (Fornell and Larcker, 1981) . We established a second-order factor analysis for the dependent variable in order to include as much information as we collected, following the same rules of thumb previously explained for the first-order factor analysis (see Appendix 1). Second, we created another construct for the responsibility of the subsidiary facing global mandates. The standardised factor loadings were also all over 0.5, as well as the composite reliability measured by Cronbach's alpha previously reported (see Appendix 2 to see the complete factor analysis). For this pair of final constructs, we estimated the discriminant validity through the correlations between them in order to validate that no construct is collecting redundant information (Fornell and Larcker, 1981) . Correlation is equal to 0.064 between these two constructs.
According to the structural model results, based on the recommended norms for good fit of X 2 /df < 3, comparative fit index (CFI) and incremental fit index (IFI) > 0.9, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) < 0.08, the fit indices for our model can be determined to be good with X 2 /df = 1.092, CFI = 0.990, IFI = 0.991 and RMSEA = 0.020. Table 5 shows the resulting standardised coefficients and the respective p-values.
Observing the model, we can state that the typology of capitalism of the country of origin has a strong impact on the degree of HR subsidiary autonomy. The order followed in measuring the VoC variable leads us to suggest that the greater the flexibility of the labour market in the country of origin, the lower the level of subsidiary autonomy over HR polices. At the same time, the higher the rigidity of the home country labour market, the lower the level of HR subsidiary autonomy. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported. Our Hypothesis 2 is not supported since the level of subsidiary responsibility facing global mandates does not seem to be significant in explaining variations in the degree of subsidiary autonomy. Hypothesis 3a is also supported. The existence of an international policy-making body for HRM is directly related to lower levels of subsidiary autonomy. This is also the case of the direct reporting of HR data from the subsidiary to HQ. Thus Hypothesis 3b is also supported. The use of an international HR information system, such as PeopleSoft or SAP HR, and the use of an HR shared services centre seem to be significant in explaining variations in the level of subsidiary autonomy, although only partially supported. Hypothesis 3c and Hypothesis 3d are then partly supported. Regarding the control variables, first, the results show that the age of the subsidiary may influence the degree of subsidiary autonomy, meaning that the older the subsidiary, the lower the level of subsidiary autonomy. Second, the size of the subsidiary does not seem to be relevant in understanding variations in HR subsidiary autonomy (cf. Ferner et al., 2011) . Third, the direct relationship between sector of operations and HR subsidiary autonomy is rejected.
CONCLUSIONS
The word 'autonomy' comes from the Greek word 'autonomos', meaning self (auto) and law, custom (nomos). In other words, autonomy means independence or living by one's own laws. MNC subsidiary autonomy has been a growing line of enquiry in international business research, especially over recent years. Fenton-O'Creevy et al., (2008: 162) analysed subsidiary autonomy from both the institutional and strategic perspective through an analysis of 'the impact of national contexts in which subsidiaries are socially embedded and institutionally rooted'. Ferner et al. (2011) also presented an analysis of subsidiary discretion, including home country effect and the influence of HRM structures. Our research seeks to identify the factors influencing on the degree of autonomy over HR practices that MNC subsidiaries enjoy. We sketched a wide spectrum surrounding HR subsidiary autonomy in order to provide an appropriate operationalisation of the theory into our statistical model. Our contributions to the existing knowledge have been provided in three different angles: the way we have dimensioned the country of origin, the individual analysis of international HR structures and providing insights on Spain as country object of study.
In so doing, we considered the country of origin as a likely determinant of the level of subsidiary autonomy over HR issues Edwards et al., 2007) . However, the way in which home and host country are dimensioned in the present work is somewhat unique. We use the lens of VoC established by Amable (2003) , which only has been previously applied within the HRM literature in relation to training and development policies (Georgen et al., 2012) . The present article supports the influence of the home country based on this typology of capitalisms. According to our findings, first, lower levels of HR subsidiary autonomy have been found in MNCs coming from countries with more flexible labour market regimes, that is from countries very different from Spain where there is a highly regulated labour market comparatively. Second, higher levels of HR subsidiary autonomy have been found in the MNCs originating in countries more similar to Spain regulation wise. These results suggest that MNCs coming from flexible labour market traditions are more used to 'strategic freedom' in deploying their preferred HR approaches, and are therefore likely to strive to do the same across borders. In addition, other reasons to be considered among the causes of this centralisation is, for example, the fact that MNCs that originated in flexible market economies have a highly skilled workforce in their home country in comparison with the workforce's profile within their subsidiaries in the Mediterranean cluster (Amable, 2003) . Therefore, MNCs that originated in flexible economies could ignore the labour market regulation to certain extent and place the decision-making process within the HQ. On the contrary, as the results support, the local side in the 'global-local' tension within the Spanish arena appears to still be the 'strong player'. In addition, MNCs originating in more regulated labour markets are more accustomed to constraint and adapting themselves to the local environment, and therefore tend to afford more HR autonomy to their subsidiaries in order to adapt to the local context. Our results totally support what Ferner et al. (2011) found through Hall and Soskice categorisation, that is that MNCs originating in CME countries are used to constraining legal conditions, and therefore their subsidiaries have a tendency towards developing decentralised practices. Nonetheless, we are aware that our study only considers one host country (Spain). However, although we need to be careful in any generalisation of our results, the contribution of this article considering Spain as host country provides us with some important insights. It not only allowed us to operationalise, in a more explicit fashion, institutional theory on VoC, but also provided a unique contribution based on this country object of study.
The impact of the international responsibility of the subsidiary facing global mandates on HR subsidiary has not been supported. We explored both strands of the literature: some experts believe subsidiary mandates are a source of central control, and some others posit that subsidiary mandates would confer subsidiaries a higher level of local autonomy based on the organisational power theory. The crucial point in the latter is that global mandates give certain power to the subsidiary in order to deal with HQ in the policy-making process (Edwards et al., 2002) . The fact that we do not support either strands may be related to limitations derived from the measurement of this construct. We consider global mandates on three aspects: R&D development, international product manufacturing and percentage of exports of the subsidiary (Edwards et al., 2002) . These three issues have been reflected within previous literature; however, these may not be covering the whole spectrum surrounding subsidiary mandates.
We also identified a lack of existing knowledge in regard to the relationship between HR subsidiary autonomy and the use of international HR structures. Our findings support some recent evidence from Ferner et al. (2011) , in terms of the direct data reporting on HR issues from the subsidiary to the HQ. In this sense, high numbers of HR issues reported are related to low levels of subsidiary autonomy. However, contrary to what Ferner et al. (2011) found, we find that other international HR structures are also related to subsidiary autonomy over HR issues, notably the presence of an international HRM policy-making body and its strong relationship with low levels of subsidiary autonomy. As Ferner et al. (2011: 485) argued 'HQ control may depend on the existence of central bodies for identifying HR policy requirements and driving policy development'. The use of HRM shared service centres and the use of HRIS are also partially related to low levels of subsidiary autonomy. The reason for the weaker relationship here may be related to the fact that the utilisation of these international HR structures are probably driven by the international HR policy-making body, which facilitates the development of these global mechanisms for the monitoring and surveillance of HR practices (Ferner et al., 2011) . This points to a need for deeper investigation of the relationship between the existence of a HR policy-making body and the use of other international HR structures. In any case, our contribution to the current literature here has been to clearly identify these international HR structures as key potential explanatory factors of HR subsidiary autonomy.
Finally, future research on this topic can be focused on a detailed analysis of the nature of the policies related to the factors determining the degree of subsidiary HR autonomy. Subsidiary autonomy within HRM seems to differ from one HR policy to the other (Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994) . In this instance, mostly case study analyses show that pay and compensation systems, the recruitment policy, and the communication policy appear more centralised than the rest of HR practices (Tayeb, 1998; Ferner et al., 2011) . However, there is no specific research on the relationship between subsidiary autonomy and international HR structures by HR type of practice.
Limitations
We are aware of the fact that the present work has a number of limitations. First, the questionnaire was administered only to a single respondent within every foreign subsidiary. It is well documented that such an approach can, on occasion, lead to common method variance (CMV), caused by single-source bias. CMV is defined as the overlapping variability in key variables due to the use of a single respondent (Podsakoff et al., 2003) . We think CMV is not likely to be a problem in this research because of the use of different scales and anchors across our key variables, and also because a high number of variables are about the existence of HR structures, therefore not related to perceptions [recommendations of Chang et al. (2010) in order to avoid CMV].
Second, a particular concern arose in terms of not supporting Hypothesis 2. The aspects considered have been largely supported by the literature, namely subsidiary mandates on R&D development, international products and the extent of exports. However, some authors have considered these measures insufficient. Their attempt to complete this measure was the inclusion of the existence of an external source of power, namely the power conferred by the type of relationship with costumers and clients (Edwards et al., 1996) , and the inclusion of the power conferred by the reverse diffusion of practices from the subsidiaries to HQ (Edwards et al., 2010) . We think that the fact that this variable is not supported in any way within our model might be given by an incomplete conception of subsidiary mandates. 
